II. The Status or Palestine under the Traditional Criteria for Statehood
It is a curious feature of modern discussions of territorial status that the "traditional definition" of a state, as expressed in the four criteria referred to in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933, 3 continues to exercise so strong a hold. It is even more curious when the Montevideo definition, which looks to the ostensibly separate elements of territory, permanent population, government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states, is then minutely examined -in some cases one would say tortured -in order to be able to argue that a particular entity fits within those criteria.
Even applying the Montevideo Convention, in a relatively superficial way, in accordance with its terms, it is difficult to see how Palestine could constitute a state. Its whole territory is occupied by Israel, which functions as a government in the territory. The Palestine Liberation Organization has never functioned as a government in respect of the occupied territories. But the Montevideo Convention treats statehood essentially as an existing state of affairs, as a matter of fact as much as a matter of law. 4 And as a matter of fact, notwithstanding that allegiance, neither the PLO nor the Palestine National Council has been in a position to exercise the whole range of governmental powers within the territory concerned. That they may have a right to do so -or, more accurately, that the Palestinian people may have a right to choose a representative authority to govern themselves -is beside the point, from the perspective of the Montevideo formula. That formula is concerned with the existence of secure governing authority rather than with any right to exercise that authority in future. It should be recalled that the Montevideo Convention was drafted at a time when the principle of self-determination was not generally recognized in international law, and when the implications of the nascent rule prohibiting the use of force between states in this context had not been worked out It may be that the idea of statehood, imperfectly expressed in the Montevideo Convention, has been modified by these developments. But it is curious that the debate about the statehood of entities such as Palestine is still conducted in terms of that Convention. Boyle's essay is a good example of this.
Rather than examining separately the four apparently discrete criteria listed in the Montevideo formula, it is preferable to focus on the notion of state independence as a prerequisite for statehood. Essentially that notion embodies two elements -the existence of an organized community on a particular territory, exclusively or substantially exercising self-governing power, and secondly, the absence of the exercise of another state, and of the right of another state to exercise, self-governing powers over the whole of that territory.5
From this perspective, the often stated proposition that the absence of clearly delimited boundaries is not a prerequisite to statehood is axiomatic. Boundaries are the consequence of territory. But territory, in the context of statehood, is not "something owned." It is the basis in space for the organized community which is the state. No doubt the PLO directly and indirectly exercises considerable influence within the occupied territories, and commands the allegiance of a significant part of the population of those territories. But this falls far short of what is required in terms of the first element, the existence of an organized self-governing community. Moreover, that Israel's governmental power and authority over those territories does not amount, for the most part, to a claim of sovereignty, that it would be unlawful if it did amount to a consensus that the Palestinian people are entitled to form a state -none of this could affect the point that they do not currently do so, if the generally-accepted principle of state independence is applied. In this respect Boyle fails to face up either to the law or the facts.
Of course there are other conceptions of statehood under which different results might be reached. The first and most obvious alternative -though Boyle does not rely upon itis the constitutive theory of statehood. According to this view an entity is a state if, and only if, it is recognized as such by other states. But the difficulty is that the constitutive theory inevitably leads to extreme subjectivity in the notion of the state. There is no rule that majority recognition is binding on third states in international law. At present Palestine has been recognized as a state by over 100 states, but it does not yet command anything like the level of quasi-unanimous support as such which would be required to establish a particular rule of international law to the effect that Palestine is a state. In the absence of such a "particular" rule, the constitutive theory leads inevitably to the proposition that another state is not bound to treat an entity as a state if it has not recognized it. Since the crucial actors here are the United States and Israel, which vehemently do not recognize Palestine as a state, the theory leads nowhere. In any event, there are compelling reasons for rejecting the constitutive theory, and most modem authorities do so.6
The second alternative would be to seek to take advantage of developments in international law since 1943 which have arguably modified the conception of statehood from that implied by the Montevideo formula. There has been a certain departure from the notion of a state as an effective territorial community independent of other states. Instead, notions of entitlement or disentitlement to be regarded as a state have been influential, at least in some situations. Thus entities which would have otherwise qualified as a state may not do so because their creation is in some significant sense illegitimate (Rhodesia, the Bantustans, the Turkish Federated States of Cyprus). Palestine involves the converse problem, that of an entity which is not sufficiently effective to be regarded as independent in fact, but which is thought entitled to be a state.
It should be stressed that we are not dealing with the situation of the extinction of states which were once, incontestably, established as such. The situation here involves the establishment of a new state on territory over which other states have claims of one kind or another. On this issue the practice is limited, though it is not non-existent In the case of a number of former Portuguese territories in Africa (Guinea-Bissau being the best example'')' the view was taken that the National Liberation Organization's extensive de facto control over large parts of the territory in question, and the apparent inevitability of its success, combined with the principle of self-determination, meant that the entity became a state in circumstances in which the recognition of its statehood would otherwise have been premature. Although the arguments in favour of premature statehood were often not set out or were poorly articulated, the importance of the principle of self-determination in such cases seems to have been that it disentitled the former sovereign to rely on its authority over the territory. On the other hand it is significant that in each of these cases the liberation organization did have a significant degree of control in the territory, such that its victory could reasonably be said to be imminent. Moreover the issue presented was one of a simple yes/no kind -independence for the territory in question or the continuation of colonial rule. There was no question of any subsisting claim by the colonial power, or indeed by any other state, to significant parts of the territory in question. The situation in Namibia provides an instructive contrast There, notwithstanding the undoubted entitlement of the people of Namibia to self-determination, as declared by the International Court in the Namibia case,& and despite the fact that the relevant liberation organization, SWAPO, did have a high degree of allegiance, and a fluctuating degree of control, in Namibia, there was no attempt to treat Namibia as being already legally a state. Instead action was taken to bring about its independence, and in the meantime to seek to protect the rights of the people of Namibia through other means (e.g. the Resolution of the United Nations Committee for Namibia on Permanent Sovereignty over its Natural Resources). In this situation the modalities of achieving independence were of great importance, and were undoubtedly an important factor in leading states to maintain the distinction between the rights of the people of Namibia and their present status. Much the same thing could be said of the Western Sahara, especially having regard to the presence of a relatively powerful neighbouring state with claims over the territory.
Thus although a majority of states have taken the view that the next logical step beyond the Guinea Bissau situation should be taken in the case of Palestine, a significant minority of states opposes that step. There is certainly not the level of support in state practice, nor in the other sources of international law, to support that additional development.
practice, nor in the other sources of international law, to support that additional development. This is not to say that the territory now designated as the territory of Palestine lacks a special legal status, or that appropriate representatives of the people of that territory do not share that status for various international purposes. the sovereignty of the nations subject to "A" class mandates pursuant to Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. That provisional recognition would be a right of peoples saved or reserved by Article 80 of the United Nations Charter. But the fact is that, with the exception of Iraq, the "provisional recognition" given by Article 22 did not amount to much.
11 In practice the "A" class mandates were subject to the normal mandatory regime, and it was not argued that the sums of the territories concerned was that of independent states. In this context the distinction between "state" and "nation", rejected by Boyle, is crucial: certain "peoples" or "nations" were recognized by Article 22 as having rights of a relatively immediate kind, but these did not as yet amount to statehood.
The second element supporting General Assembly Authority, according to Boyle, arises from his assertion that the General Assembly was the successor to the League of Nations with respect to the mandate system. But there was no direct succession between the League of Nations and the United Nations in this or in other respects, and this lack of succession was wholly deliberate. Instead, the International Court in 1950'2 and again in 197113 supported the exercise by the United Nations of authority with respect to mandates on the basis of arguments which did not depend on a rule of succession. Moreover, although the General Assembly acquired power through these means to revoke the mandate for South West Africa, that power was not of a general discretionary or governing kind, but was more in the nature of a declaratory power exercised on behalf of the international community in a situation where no state had sovereignty over the territory concerned. The binding character of that decision, and in particular the legal consequences foT states as set out in the Namibia Opinion, were in a substantial part due to the opera- 181(11) of 29 November 1947) was "a condition for its admission" to the United Nations. The essential point here is that, although the relevant Jewish organization did accept the Partition Resolution when it was first adopted, the Resolution was not accepted by the Arab states involved. Instead war broke out, leading to a cease-fire on quite different boundaries. Israel was not admitted to the United Nations on the basis of a division of territory which in any way reflected the partition resolution. Moreover the Charter makes no provision for "conditional admission."
V. Conclusion
It has to be said that the case for Palestinian statehood presented by Boyle is weak and unconvincing. Indeed it is weaker and more unconvincing than it need have been, having regard to some of the post-1945 developments, and in particular to the case of Guinea Bissau. But if that case is to be justified on the premise "nasciturus pro jam natus habetur",!* the fact remains that a Teal State of Palestine is by no means yet assured. For a Palestinian State to be properly described as "nasciturus", what is needed is statesmanship on all sides, and respect for the rights of the peoples and states of the region. The manipulation of legal categories is unlikely to advance matters.
